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For over a quarter of a century, the use of utility information based upon interpersonal 
comparisons has been seen as an escape route from the Arrow Impossibility Theorem.  This 
paper critically examines this informational basis approach to social choice.  Even with 
comparability of differences and levels, feasible social choice rules must be insensitive to a 
range of distributional issues.  Also, the Pareto principle is not solely to blame for the 
inability to adopt rules combining utility and non-utility information:  if the Pareto 
principle is not invoked then there is no way of combining utility and non-utility 
information in a ranking of states unless levels of utility are comparable; with only level 
comparability, information must be combined in restrictive ways and the notion of giving 
different independent weight to different considerations is ruled out.  If informational bases 
are viewed as the restriction on information that is available, rather than a theoretical limit 
on information, then there exist methods to estimate richer informational structures and 
overcome some of these difficulties. 
 
*The author is grateful to Marc Fleurbaey for his comments.  
1. Introduction 
 
Social choice theory is concerned with the principles underlying choice and preference 
when a group of individuals have different preferences over the options available.  In the 
sense that it is thought desirable to reflect individual preference in a group preference, 
social choice theory deals with the principles of aggregation of preference.  At this general 
level, social choice theory is applicable to decisions making by committees, the political 
voting process, and most aspects of welfare economics. 
 
In narrower terms, social choice theory is concerned with the formal analysis of the 
aggregation of information to generate a social choice or preference.  The basic building 
block for this theory is the work of Kenneth Arrow (1951), the generalization to permit an 
understanding of how the aggregation of information is sensitive to the nature of 
information available is due to Amartya Sen, most notably in his book Collective Choice 
and Social Welfare (Sen (1970)).  This book remains a tour de force in terms of being both 
a map to guide researchers and an inspiration to them in their endeavours.  Indeed, the 
flowering of the subject in the 1970s and later is due directly to clarity of the issues that 
Sen laid out in that book. 
 
The purpose of this essay is to critically examine the informational basis approach to social 
choice as developed by Sen.
1  The major finding of Arrow - his famous General 
(Im)possibility Theorem - is that aggregation in the social choice is impossible if the 
aggregation process is to satisfy a set of  'reasonable' conditions.  Sen's work points to the 
informational restrictions inherent in the Arrow set-up and shows that aggregation with 
richer information permits social choices to be made with more 'appealing' mechanisms.  In 
particular, this richer information may include utility or individual welfare information that 
is interpersonally comparable.  The nature and extent of this comparability is a major focus 
of the subject and of this essay. 
                                                 
1 In the field of social choice, broadly conceived, Sen has made many contributions across a wide range 
of fields.  Within the field more narrowly conceived, one can separate out at least three sub-fields 
where his contribution has been fundamental - the conditions under which majority rule gives rise to an 
ordering of social states (Sen (1966), see also Sen and Pattanaik (1969)), the conflict between rights 
and Paretianism (Sen 1970a), and the generalization of the Arrow paradigm to social welfare 
functionals which is the subject of this essay.  
I start with a presentation of Arrows's approach to the analysis of social choice, based upon 
the use of a social welfare function, and of Sen's extension to this, based upon the use of a 
social welfare functional.  I then consider alternative informational bases for interpersonal 




Given the nature of the original Arrow result, it is not surprising that Sen's approach has 
been viewed as a solution to its negativeness.  However, part of the purpose of this essay is 
to demonstrate that conventional notions of comparability of utilities imply, through their 
informational parsimony, a restrictiveness in terms of mechanisms for social choice.  This 
is particularly the case if comparability information is restricted because more detailed 
information is considered meaningless, rather than being considered meaningful but not 
available.  Within a welfarist context, feasible mechanisms to generate social welfare from 
the aggregation of individual welfares remain restrictive.  In a more general non-welfarist 
context, it will be shown that mild restrictions on utility information become very 
important when welfare information must be compared with non-welfare information.
3  
This will be demonstrated by exposing the difficulties of moving beyond welfarism, even 
when welfarist conditions like the Pareto criterion are not invoked. 
 
2. Social  Choice  Theory 
 
Social choice has a long history, dating back at least to ancient Greece.  A recurring theme 
has been the difficulty of aggregating individual preferences into a social preference.  This 
has been demonstrated by considering examples of situations where difficulties occur, the 
most well-known being the paradox of majority voting associated with Condorcet (1785): 
consider three individuals, individual 1 prefers social state or outcome x to y to z, 2 prefers 
y to z to x and 3 prefers z to x to y: a majority (1 and 3) prefer x to y, a majority (1 and 2) 
prefer y to z and a majority (2 and 3) prefer z and x.  Thus, for any state, there is another 
                                                 
2 Following Sen, the term informational basis is assumed to relate to the structure of individual utility 
or welfare information.  A wider interpretation can also be adopted (Fleurbaey (2003)). 
3 It is not the purpose of this essay to examine Sen's work on the role of non-utility information and the 
conflict of rights and the Pareto principles (Sen (1970a)).  Here, the conflict is less stark but it does not 
require the sledge-hammer of the Pareto principle (Sen (1979)) to expose the difficulties of adopting a 
pluralist approach, encompassing welfarist and non-welfarist principles. state preferred by a majority, and a ranking of states based upon majority rule is 
intransitive.  Other voting methods would give more satisfactory results in this situation but 
possess other problems, again being demonstrated by invoking examples.  The problem 
with analyses of this sort is that they do not move beyond a collection of examples and it is 
to Arrow (1951) that we owe the debt for creating a more general approach to the subject.  
In essence, he sought to move away from an investigation of how particular aggregation 
mechanisms worked in particular cases to how classes of mechanisms worked in all 
'feasible' scenarios. 
 
We lay out some formalities.  Assume that we wish to construct a social ordering of social 
states.  An ordering is complete (two states can be compared), reflexive (a state is as good 
as itself), and transitive (if x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as z then x is at 
least as good as z).  The set of social states is X, and xRy, where  ,, x yX ∈  denotes the fact 
that x is socially weakly preferred to y (x I y denotes indifference and x P y denotes strict 
preference).  Arrow considers the aggregation of individual preferences which, themselves, 
are orderings over X.  Thus, assume that there is a set of individuals N and, for   
denotes i's ordering of the social states.  A social welfare function (SWF) f  is an 
aggregation mechanism, which determines a social ordering as a function of individual 
orderings: 
, i iN R ∈
( i iN Rf R
∈ = ) .  The most obvious examples of social welfare functions are 
voting mechanisms like majority rule.  It is inherent in the Arrow structure that individual 
utility information consists of individual orderings - there is no intensity of preference or 
ranking of utility levels across individuals. 
 
In a particular situation or example, the individual preferences are specified and f 
determines some social ordering.  Arrow lays down four conditions that should be satisfied 
by a SWF: 
 
(U) Unrestricted  Domain:  f is defined for all possible individual orderings 
 
(I) Independence:  If  and  i iN iN RR
∈ i ∈ ′  coincide over some pair of states x and y then 
( i iN RfR
∈ = )  is the same as  ( ) ' i iN Rf R
∈ ′ =  over the pair {x,y}. 
 (P) Pareto:  If  i xPy for all i  then  N ∈ xPy  (where P is derived from  () ii iN Rf R
∈ =  
and  i R  is each individual's ordering giving rise to the strict preference over {x,y}). 
 
(ND)  Non-Dictatorship: For each individual d, there exists a set of preferences  i R  and a 
pair {x,y} such that  d xPyand y R x  ( ) ( ). i iN RfR
∈ =  
 
Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that there exists no SWF satisfying these four 
conditions, e.g. majority voting fails (U) because in some situations the ranking it creates is 
not an ordering. 
 
Condition (U) demands that an ordering can be created for all individual preferences - it 
forces a consideration of counter-factuals so that a social ordering needs to be created not 
only for individual orderings that actually occur but also for hypothetical possibilities.
4  
Condition (I) relies upon the use of counter-factuals to ensure that the social choice 
between a pair {x,y} is independent of the individual rankings of any other pairs of states - 
it is by intention consequentalist.  Condition (P) is a welfarist condition pointing both to a 
desire to respect individual preference and a willingness to be guided only by individual 
preference when there is unanimity.  Condition ND requires that social preference does not 
reflect one person's individual preference irrespective of the preferences of other 
individuals. 
 
In the Arrow framework, what is the information on which the social ordering is based? 
Utility information enters directly through the individual orderings of states.  Other 
information enters through the description of each state which, for instance, serves to 
differentiate state x from y.  This information can be rich in terms of a description of 
society in each state but condition (U) can only be reasonable if states x and y are described 
sufficiently loosely for individuals to have any preference between x and y.  It could be 
possible to say that individual i has an adequate well-being in state x as a description of 
state x but it would not then be possible to say that i's well-being in state y is inadequate, 
                                                 
4 One can avoid the use of hypothetical possibilities if the set of social states is sufficiently large and 
the set of individual orderings are sufficiently rich, this richness extending to triples of states which are 
viewed as similar apart from with regard to individual preference over the triples.  See Parks (1976).  
For aggregation based upon social welfare functionals as developed below, see Roberts (1980b). given that it is possible that  i yRx and (U) demands that it is reasonable to construct a social 
ordering in this situation.  Thus, if condition (U) is to be reasonable, non-utility information 
can enter into the primitive description of states in limited ways. 
 
3.  Sen's Social Welfare Functional 
 
It is now a commonplace to view the Arrow problem as an attempt to determine a 
reasonable social ordering with too little, particularly utility, information.  We owe this 
interpretation to Sen (1970).  He proposes a generalization of the Arrow approach to make 
possible the incorporation of richer utility information.  Utility information is captured by a 
numerical representation of utility so that u(x,i) denotes utility in state x of individual i.  
Instead of a SWF, we have a social welfare functional (SWFL) f mapping utility 
representations into a social ordering:  ( ) , (,) .
xX iN Rfu x i
∈∈ =   The Arrow conditions can 




5:    If  u  and  u′  are two numerical representations that coincide over 
a pair of states {x,y}, i . e .   (,) (,)  a n d   (,) (,)  f o r  a l l    u x iu x i u y iu y i ′ ′ = =  
( ) , then  iN Rfu ∈=  and ( ) R fu ′ ′ = coincide over {x,y}. 
 





The usefulness of using SWFLs is that utility information can incorporate more 
information than is contained in a simple individual ordering.  The information content of 
utility information can be fine-tuned by imposing conditions which ensure that a SWFL 
treats different numerical representations as equivalent.  Let U be the set of all real valued  
functions defined over XxN.  Consider partitioning U  into a collection of subsets P1,....,PK 




= =∪ k PP φ ∩= A  for all  .  We call P={P1,......,PK } a partition and let 
P  be the set of all partitions of u.  A partition  captures the informational context of 
utilities and this suggests the definition 
, k A
                                                 
5 We use an asterisk to denote that the condition applies to SWFLs.  
P-Invariance (P-I
*):   A SWFL f is P-invariant with respect to partitioning  { } 1,......,   k PP P =  
( ) ( ) if for all  , , for some  , . k u uP k fu fu ′ ′ ∈=  
 
If the partitioning of u, call it  , is such that u and u P  ′ are in the same partition if they 
induce the same ordering of states for each individual, i.e. for all 
,, :(,) (,) (,) (,) , iN x yX u x i u y i u x i u y i ′ ′ ∈∈ ≥⇔≥  then a SWFL that is P-Invariant with 
respect to   ignores all utility information other than individual orderings.  By Arrow's 




*) which is P-Invariant 




The idea of capturing utility information as a partition of U is that utility functions in the 
same partition are informationally equivalent.  The coarser the partition, the more 
demanding is P-Invariance. 
 
4.  Information Bases of Interpersonal Comparability and Invariance 
Transforms 
 
In this section, we show how different types of interpersonal comparability can be captured 
using partitions generated through the use of invariance transforms.  We go on to examine 
the extent to which richer informational structures as captured by finer partitions overcome 
the pessimism generated by the Arrow Impossibility Theorem. 
 
In terms of utility information, it is usual to view utilities as being ordinal or cardinal.  
Looking first at just one individual's utility function, ordinality captures the idea that utility 
information defines an ordering of states - the levels of utility can be ordered - but no more. 
Thus, the primitive notion is an individual ordering.  This ordering can be given a 
numerical utility representation by assigning higher utility to more preferred outcomes and 
the arbitrariness of the particular representation is captured by P-Invariance with the partitioning  . P  6  An alternative method of defining equivalence of utility functions is to 
use the idea of an invariance transform < i φ > which has the property that  (( ,) ) i ui φ ⋅  is 
equivalent to   - under ordinalism,  (, ) ui ⋅ i φ  can be any strictly monotonic transformation.
7
 
Ordinality allows levels of utility to be compared.  Cardinality allows utility differences to 
be compared: the ordering of  (,) (,) uxi uyi −  over the set XxX is the same for all utility 
functions with the same information partition.  In terms of an invariance transform,  i φ is an 
affine strictly increasing affine transformation:  () ii i i i uu φ αβ = +  where  0. i β >  
 
The informational content of utility functions becomes interesting when there is 
comparability across individuals (Sen (1970,1977)).  Levels of utility are comparable, e.g. 
the statement that individual i in state x is better off than j in state y, if the partitioning of 
the utility space distinguishes between two utility functions  (,) u ⋅ ⋅ and   with a 
different ordering in XxN space.  Thus level comparability is an ordinal notion and an 




*) and (P-I) with this information 
partition is a Rawlsian maximin rule which ranks states according to the well-being of the 
worst-off in each state. 
(,) u′ ⋅⋅
 
If differences in utility are comparable then  ( , ) ( , ) uxi uyi −  can be ordered in XxXxN space, 
e.g. statements of the form that i gains more from the move from x to y than j gains from 
the move from w to z can be made.  This is a cardinal notion and, in terms of invariance 
transforms, it is necessary that if  () ii i i i uu φ αβ = +  and  ( ) j jj j uu j φ αβ = +  then  . ij β β =   
Comparability of differences - often termed unit comparability - underlies what is 
necessary for the implementation of a utilitarian rule. 
 
Comparability of levels and differences is not, of course, an either/or.  If there is both an 
ordering of levels and a compatible ordering of utility differences then we have, what Sen 
                                                 
i
6 If the number of states is a continuum then some continuity assumption is required to ensure the 
existence of a numerical representation.  With cardinal utility representations, there are extra technical 
demands (Basu (1983), Roberts (1997)). 
7 For a set of invariance transforms   to define a partitioning of the utility space, it is required that i) 
 contains the identity transform; ii) if 
i Φ
i Φ i φ ∈Φ  then 
1
i φ
− ∈Φ  and iii)  ii φ′∈Φ  and 
  () . ii i i φφ φ ′′ ′ ′′ ∈Φ ⇒ ∈Φi(1970, 1970b) has termed, full comparability.  If this is to be captured by the use of 
invariance transforms then  i φ  must take the form  () , 0 , ii i uu φ αβ β = +>  where 
 and  α β are independent of i. 
 
We can add more comparability above and beyond full comparability.  For instance, it may 
be possible to compare the level of individual utility with some independent norm which 
may allow one to make judgements about the value of increasing the population size, e.g. a 
population increase may be desirable if the 'new' individuals have a utility above the norm.  
This is termed ratio-scale comparability.  If there is an independent norm, the utility 
representation can be chosen to ensure that the norm has zero utility and, in terms of 
invariance transforms, we will have  () ii i uu φ β =  where  0 β >  is independent of i.  In the 
limit, we could move to a degree of comparability that implied that each partition consisted 
of one element.  To obtain this from an ordering it would be necessary to rank outcomes 
against a set of independent norms or, more concretely, an independent 'yardstick'.  Let us 
call this total comparability. 
 
5. Aggregation  Possibilities 
 
A generally accepted view is that whilst there is no acceptable method of aggregation based 
upon the use of individual non-comparable orderings, a wide range of possibilities is 
opened up when richer informational structures are permitted. 
 




*).  If utility 
functions are cardinal but not comparable then utility differences are intrapersonally 
comparable.  However, this information relates to the utility that an individual achieves in 
at least three states, e.g. the difference in utility between x and y and between x and z, say.  
By (I
*), this is ruled out as admissible information that can influence the aggregation rule.  
Thus, cardinality without comparability still gives rise to impossibility, a first (negative) 
characterization result, proved by Sen (1970), which moved beyond the Arrow framework. 
To make progress, we need to use interpersonally comparable information.  If there is 
comparability of differences, but no more, then the set of aggregation rules satisfying (U*), 
(I*), (P*),and (ND*) is the set of weighted utilitarian functions with different individual utility functions being given different weights.  This important characterization result is 
proved by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977).   If there is a desire to treat individuals 
symmetrically – a condition of anonymity – then the only admissible aggregation rule is the 
(unweighted) utilitarian rule.  These rules apply when the weighted sum of utilities is 
strictly greater in one state than another; when the sum is the same in the two states, it is 
possible that the ranking can depend upon non-utility information serving to define social 
states (Roberts (1980a)).  
 If there is comparability of levels, but no more, then the set of aggregation rules take the 
form of associating the welfare of any state with the utility level of one individual in that 
state, the individual in each state being determined by who is the person and/or the position 
of the individual in the hierarchy of utilities in that state (Roberts (1980)).  If the symmetry 
condition of anonymity is added then welfare is associated with the utility level at some 
position in the utility hierarchy (Gevers (1979)).  Adding a minimal equity condition, 
which says that individuals with lower utility should be given at least as much weight as 
those with higher utility, ensures that the position in the hierarchy on which to focus is the 
individual with lowest utility (Hammond (1975), Strasnick (1976)).  We are thus led to the 
conclusion that interpersonal comparability of levels, but no more than this, leads to a 
Rawlsian maximin aggregation rule. 
 Assume that there is both comparability of differences and comparability of levels so we 
have full comparability, an informational structure that economists, at least, seem to 
consider rich.  With such comparability, there is no information which tells us that we are 
discussing a society where everybody is subject to abject poverty or to unlimited riches – 
adding a constant to everybody’s utility does not change comparisons of levels or of 
differences.  Any aggregation mechanism must be insensitive to this concern.  Relatedly, 
the aggregation mechanism must be insensitive to the extent of utility inequality as utility 
differences can be scaled upwards or downwards.  In particular, aggregation mechanisms 
cannot be more sensitive to inequality, the greater it becomes.  For instance, if, in a two-
person society, it is determined that the utility vector (10,10) gives as much social welfare 
as (8,14) then, by admissible scaling of utilities, these vectors give also the same social 
welfare as (9,12), using a scaling factor β =1/2, or (6,18), using a scaling factor β = 2.
8  In 
                                                 
8 The class of possible aggregation mechanisms under full comparability is characterized in Roberts 
(1980a).  If one also imposes a separability condition which states that the social ordering over a pair of 
social states x and y should not be sensitive to utility information of individuals whose well-being is the particular, it can be seen that attitudes to small deviations from equality are fully inherited 
by the attitudes to large deviations from equality.
9 These considerations are unimportant to 
a utilitarian or to a welfarist Rawlsian, the utilitarian being unconcerned with utility 
inequality, the Rawlsian showing maximum concern at all times.  But to implement a rich 
class of aggregation mechanisms, with attitudes to inequality depending upon the extent of 
inequality, the informational requirements seem to demand the existence of an independent 
yardstick.  Thus, the use of interpersonal comparisons may allow one to escape from the 
straitjacket of the Arrow result but the informational basis approach to social choice points 
to the restrictiveness of possible aggregation mechanisms, restrictiveness coming from the 
'technical' limitations of the information on which judgments can be based. 
 
6.  Utility Information in Interpersonal Comparisons 
 
The social welfare functional (SWFL) approach is based upon individual well-being 
information being captured by a utility function.  To economists, the usual use of a utility 
function is as a way of representing a preference ordering with any meaning to the notion 
of utility coming entirely from the nature of the preference order being represented.  With 
an ordinal ordering, the utility function is a labelling of states; with cardinal orderings there 
are restrictions on the orderings which permit representation (Basu (1983), Roberts (1997)) 
and these restrictions are reasonable given that the cardinal ranking relates to a ranking of 
differences.   
 
We have seen in section 4 that utility information in its primitive form can be captured by 
an ordering of utility levels and/or utility differences.  It may therefore appear more natural 
to consider SWFLs as a function of these orderings directly rather than through the 
intermediate step of creating a representative utility function.  Here we show that the use of 
this intermediate step has some hidden implications. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
same in the two states, then the only possible aggregation mechanisms involve a focus on the worst-off, 
as in a maximin, a focus on the best-off, or a utilitarian focus on total utility.  The details of this 
characterization are in Deschamps and Gevers (1978). 
9 This implies that iso-welfare curves in utility space must be cones emanating from points of full 
equality.  See Roberts (1980a). Consider an example where interpersonal comparability takes the form of difference 
comparability and, over a pair of states, x and y, a three individual society exhibits the 
following difference orderings 
 
                               (†)  ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,2) ( ,2) ( ,3) ( ,3) 0 ux uy uy ux uy ux −>−>−>
 
Here, the placement of zero is information derivable from the preference ordering of states 
of each individual.  Would a utilitarian prefer x to y or vice versa?  Individual 1 gains more 
in the move from y to x than individuals 2 and 3 each lose but the 'cumulative' loss of 2 and 
3 may dominate 1's gain.  Thus if we use a SWFL based upon comparability orderings and 
we invoke an independence condition, call it (I
**), that makes the social ranking over {x,y} 
independent of difference orderings involving states other than {x,y} then, in this example, 
a utilitarian rule would not be implementable.
10  So, if an unrestricted domain condition 
(U
**) is imposed requiring a SWFL to create a social ordering in all cases then the 
utilitarian rule is not an admissible SWFL.  In fact, we can prove an interesting result for a 
world where the informational basis is a ranking of utility differences (where (P
**) and 
(ND








**) is a weighted 
utilitarian rule giving equal weight to two individuals (d1, and d2, say) and zero weight to 
all other individuals. 
 









*) under the invariance transform of difference comparability.  From d'Aspremont 
and Gevers (1977), any such rule must take the form of ranking states according to a 
weighted sum of utilities.  Assume that at least three individuals are given positive weight.  
Label these three individuals 1, 2, 3, their labelling relating to their weight in the weighted 
sum of utilities:  123 . γ γγ ≤ ≤   Assume that u(x,i)=u(y,i) for all  1,2,3 i ≠ and let 1, 2 and 3's 
utility information over the pair {x,y} be as in (†) above.  What is the weighted sum of 
utilities over {x,y} in this case?  Compatible with (†) is u(x,1) −u(y,1) being sufficiently 
positive (compared to the other utility differences) so that the weighted sum of utilities is 
higher in state x than y.  Thus xPy in scenario (†).  However, compatible with (†) is a case 
                                                 
10 See Bossert (1991). where the three utility differences are equal so that, as  23 www 1 + >  the weighted sum of 
utilities is higher in state y.  We have thus shown that the weighted utilitarian rule with 
three individuals being given weight cannot be implemented based upon an ordering of 
utility differences.  Now assume that only two individuals, 1 and 2, are given weight and 
that  21 () . γ γ >   When the ranking of differences as in (†), the weighted sum of utilities is 
higher under y when u(x,1) u(y,1) is close to u(y,2) − −u(x,2,) because  21 γ γ > , and the 
weighted sum is higher under x when u(x,1) −u(y,1) is large compared to u(y,2)  u(x,2).  
Again, the weighted utilitarian rule is not implementable.  If only one individual has 
positive weight then (ND
**) is directly violated so we are left with the possibility that two 
individuals, 1 and 2, have equal weight and all others have zero weight.  If sign(u(x,1)-
u(y,1))=sign(u(x,2)  u(y,2)) then the weighted sum of utilities is unambiguous.  
Otherwise, for some labelling of the two individuals and the two states, we have u(x,1) 
u(y,1)>u(y,2)  u(x,2)>0 and the weighted sum of utilities is always higher in state x: 





Whilst a oligarchy of two individuals awards a dictatorship it is not much of an 
improvement for a society of perhaps many million! 
 
The theorem above shows the possibilities when the available information is a ranking of 
utility differences.  However, the standard approach to aggregation with information based 
upon utility differences does not give this result.  With a SWFL based upon utility 
information and this information incorporating difference comparability, i.e. with 
invariance transforms of the form  () , 0 , ii i i uu φ αββ = +>  inducing the invariance 






*) for this information structure defines the class of admissible SWFLs 
to be the class of weighted utilitarian functions: the social ordering is determined by the 




⋅ ∑  for appropriate weights  i γ .
11  How is the difference between the 
two results to be explained?  The important source of this difference is that utility 
information is created from the ranking of utility differences and utility information 
relating to a pair of states {x,y} can incorporate information about utility differences 
                                                 
11 The Pareto condition implies that all the i γ are non-negative and at least two must be positive.  The 
weights are otherwise unrestricted. involving states other than x and y.  To see this, consider again the three-person example 
given in (†).  Assume that among all other states, there is a state z such that 
 
u(z,2) −u(y,2)=u(y,3) −u(x,3) 
 
Knowing this, it is now possible to compare the sum of utilities over the pair {x,y}.  We 
have: 
1,3
[(,) (,) ] (, 1 ) (, 1 )
                                  ( ,2) ( ,2)
                                ( ,2) ( ,2)
                                ( ( ,1) ( ,1))
                           
i










    ( ( ,2) ( ,2)). uz ux −−
 
 
Thus, the ranking of the sum can be computed by information determined by the ordering 
of utility differences.  But to determine information relating to utility differences over {x,y} 
it is necessary to consider utility differences relating to another state z - the ordering of 
differences over all pairs of states provides utility information relating to states x and y.  If 
the problem is sufficiently rich, in the sense that states like state z in this example always 
exist, then, subject to the invariance transform for utility differences, a utility function will 
be uniquely defined and a weighted utilitarian ranking can always be determined. 
 
In the SWFL approach based upon utility functions, the independence condition is subtly 
different to an independence condition which only allows information relating to {x,y} to 
determine the social ranking over {x,y}.  Condition (I
*) demands that only utility 
information over {x,y} is used to determine the social ranking over {x,y}.  However, the 
ranking of utility differences involving states other than {x,y} is used to create the utility 
function over {x,y}: rankings involving other alternatives is used to inform what can be 
inferred about utilities over {x,y}.  Consequentalism in a strict sense, as captured by (I**) 
for instance, is foregone but the motivation for looking at alternative states is fully 
compatible with the thrust of consequentalism.  It is not widely understood that this 
approach relies upon a degree of non-independence which permits information relating to 
'irrelevant' alternatives to be relevant. 
 7.  Meaningful Comparisons and the Information for Comparisons 
 
Robbins (1935) famously asserted the meaninglessness of interpersonal comparisons and 
the influence of this idea still casts a shadow over welfare economics.  Excluding 
meaningless in a technical sense, which could relate to comparisons that failed a rationality 
test like transitivity, there still remains a notion of meaningless which relates to how we 
comprehend statements of comparison.  For instance, it may not be difficult to comprehend 
an ordinal comparison of the form that A is better off than B whereas to say that A is three 
times as well off as B lacks such comprehension.  Part of the problem here relates to the 
introduction of numerical quantities to compare aspects of well-being.  But if, say, an 
ordering based upon ratio-scale comparisons is accepted then, by using such comparisons 
over the set of all social states and individuals, this would, through a similar path to that 
followed in the last section, allow numerical comparisons of relative well-being to be 
created.  However, numerical comparisons, whilst being an implication of ratio-scale 
comparisons, could, because they are not part of normal vocabulary, be avoided in the 
presentation of individual utility information.  It is a presentational matter only:  if ratio-
scale comparisons can be made then aggregation rules based upon (relative) numerical 
comparisons of utility can be implemented.   
 
However, despite this, the basic general point remains: it is easier to accept that somebody 
could find ratio-scale comparisons incomprehensible than that they would find 
interpersonal comparisons of utility differences incomprehensible. 
 
7.1  Informational Bases as Available Information 
 
Another interpretation of alternative information bases is that they relate to the information 
that is available to be aggregated.  Thus, there may be a desire to implement a utilitarian 
rule, and this requires comparability of differences, but the information available takes the 
form of non-interpersonally comparable individual preference orderings.  There are at least 
two approaches that can be taken.  First, there is the conservative approach which gives up 
on the idea of generating a complete social ordering and, instead, only ranks two states if, 
with the information available, it is clear that the sum of utilities is at least as high in one state than in the other.  In the present example, this would mean that states would be ranked 
only if they were comparable under the Pareto criterion. 
 
The alternative, more radical, approach is to use available information to estimate a ranking 
of utility differences.  In the present example, one approach is to take each individual's 
preference ordering and assign a utility of zero to the worst state, a utility of unity to the 
next worst, two to the next worst, and so on.  If a utilitarian rule is applied to this 
information then the aggregation procedure is the well-known Borda rule of voting.  Here, 
note that condition (I) is violated because information from other states is used to estimate 
utility information for each pair of states.  However, once this is done, the aggregation rule 
that is utilized is avowedly consequentalist.  We note that there are many methods of using 
preference orderings to estimate difference comparable information.  This contrasts with 
what was uncovered in the last section where information from other states enriches the 
information related to a pair of states but it does so non-conjecturally. 
 
The Borda rule is one way of creating interpersonally comparable welfare differences.  
Without further information beyond preference orderings, the utility difference between 
two adjacently ranked states is as likely as not to be greater than the utility difference 
between any two other adjacently ranked states.  The expected utility difference in the two 
circumstances is the same and so the Borda rule may be viewed as the expression of the 
judgement of a utilitarian expected welfare maximizer faced with very limited information.  
Similarly, if level comparable information is available then a utility of zero can be assigned 
to the lowest utility level faced  by any individual in any state, unity to the second lowest 
level faced by any individual in any state, and so on (Sen (1977)).  Here, the utility 
difference between two adjacently ranked states for some individual will vary with 
comparability across individuals being used to estimate the cardinal ranking for the single 
individual. 
 
As well as using utility information in other states to estimate utility information relating to 
a pair of states, there is also the possibility of using non-utility information incorporated 
into the description of social states.  For instance, individual income is often used as an 
indicator of well-being.  If the description of states includes individual income information 
then this may be combined with available utility information to enhance the quality of 
utility information.  However, the reasonableness of this approach is in conflict with the unrestricted domain condition (U*) which requires that the SWFL determines a social 
ordering for all utility information.  If the description of social states provides information 
that is useful to enhance the quality of utility information then it is doubtful, for instance, 
that all individual orderings of the states can be feasible.
12  Formally, condition (U*) 
becomes a condition that one would not wish to impose on aggregation mechanisms. 
 
Consider an example where social states include a description of the observable status of 
individuals, including social variables, e.g. health status, and economic variables, like 
income.  Let us accept a restricted domain condition which takes the form that, holding 
other variables constant, an individual is better-off in states where his income is higher.  
Assume that available information is ordinal and non-comparable, captured for individual i 
by a utility function  u(yi, si, i) where yi is i’s income and si is a vector of observable non-
income variables.  The utility function serves to provide information about the trade-off  in 
well-being for i between income and other variables. 
 
If the domain of the utility function is sufficiently unrestricted then it is possible to discover 
the income level which, in some benchmark situation s*, gives  i  the same utility level as 
in any particular social state.  Define m(yi, si ,i) as follows: 
 
(,, ) ((,, ) , * , ) ii ii uysi umysi s i =  
The function m is an ordinal representation of i’s utility  -  a money metric utility function.  
If s* is fixed then any welfare function as a function of these money-metric utilities can be 
implemented.  For instance, in a two-person world, consider the welfare function (where mi 
is money-metric utility of individual i) 
 




This welfare function would not be implementable if, for instance, the utility functions 
were provided by utility information based upon ratio-scale comparisons – the ranking 
between (bm1, bm2) and (bm1, bm2) is not independent of the scale factor b. Let m1=1, 
m2=5, m1=3, m2=4. Then both (m1, m2) and (m1, m2) give a welfare of 32. However, if the 
                                                 
12 If non-utility information is used to update beliefs then, formally, it is possible that utility and non-
utility information are statistically dependent even though the supports of the distribution functions 
underlying beliefs are independent.   utilities are scaled by b=3/2, (bm1, bm2) gives higher welfare, if they are scaled by b=3, 
(bm1, bm2) gives higher welfare. 
 
The example demonstrates that non-utility information and, in particular, information from 
other social states, can be used to “create” utility information with none of the 
measurability and comparability restrictions as discussed in Section 4 above. 
13  The 
welfare function described above may be rejected because it is based upon meaningless 
comparisons but, if such comparisons are considered to be meaningful then non-utility 
information can be used to estimate the information that is necessary to implement such a 
function. The money-metric utility function is an example of a created utility function 
embodying measurability and comparability characteristics different from the original 
utility information.  Again, as with the utilitarian justification for the Borda rule, the 
created utility function involves a degree of conjecture; in the present example, this relates 
to a relationship between income and utility. 
 
7.2  Partial Comparability 
 
Once it is accepted that utility information is incomplete, there exists the possibility that 
available information may be more informative than is implied by being complete with 
respect to one information base, and incomplete with respect to some richer base. For 
instance, some but not all utility differences may be interpersonally comparable with 
individual preference orderings being complete. As Sen has put it, ‘We may, for example, 
have no great difficulty in accepting that Emperor Nero’s utility gain from the burning of 
Rome was smaller than the sum-total of the utility loss of all the other Romans who 
suffered from the fire’ (Sen (1999)). 
 
The analysis of this situation has been initiated by Sen (1970,1970b) who uses a utility 
function approach and focuses on the case where comparability of differences would 
constitute complete information.  Thus, if  u(x,i) is a utility function representation of 
available information and  
 
                                                 
13 The use of data about income or expenditure and social  variables is one route to take when faced 
with a recognized lack of welfare information (Sen (1999)). The example uses information from other 
states which give the same utility level to individuals as the state under consideration (see Pazner 
(1979)).  (,) (,) i ux i u x i α β ′ = +  
 
for all x,i and for some αi and β > 0, u and u′capture equivalent information.  As 
comparability of differences constitutes complete information, wishing to treat all 
individuals symmetrically would imply that the preferred aggregation mechanism would be 
utilitarianism. 
 
Sen capures incomplete information by specifying information as a subset L of all utility 
functions defined over X x N. If u(.,.) is a member of L then, as comparability of differences 
gives the richest information structure, u′(.,.) as defined above will be a member of L. 
However, L may extend beyond such functions. For instance, it may include all utility 
functions of the form 
(,) (,) ii ux i u x i α β ′′ = +  
 
where b ≤ βi /βj, for all i,j and some b≤1. If b=1 then the set does not extend beyond the set 
defined by the   functions; if b is close to zero then the set of u u′ ′′ functions preserve only 
the cardinality of individuals’ utility functions and interpersonal comparability is lost. The 
subset L can be thought of as being created from a primitive ranking of utility differences 
which will rank only in some circumstances (recall the Emperor Nero example above). 
Using the (incomplete) ranking, the set L will be determined as the set of all utility 
functions compatible with the ranking. 
 
Unlike the case of complete information, where the set of all utility functions is partitioned 
into subsets where any two utility functions in the same partition capture equivalent 
information, each subset L captures the full extent of incompleteness as well as features of 
the information base that would be implied by complete information.  This means that two 
different sets L and   of information can intersect. For instance, an individual may prefer 
state w to x to y to z. Let L be the set of utility functions capturing this information and the 
information that the utility difference between w and x is greater than the difference 
between x and y. Similarly, let 
L′
L′ be the set that captures ordinal information plus the fact 
that the utility difference between x and y is greater than between y and z. There are utility 
functions compatible with the union of this information, which will be members of the 
intersection of L and  , and there are utility functions compatible with one of the pieces of  L′extra information but not the other (so L is not a subset of L′ and vice versa).  
Furthermore, if more information is added then the set of feasible utility functions is 
restricted and so L can be a subset of another set L′. 
 
The question arises as to how to aggregate the available information in this environment. If 
comparability of differences is meaningful then it may be desirable to choose between 
states based upon the utilitarian sum of utilities. The situation is a variant of the one we 
investigated in section 7.1. If a social ranking is made only when all utility functions in the 
set L imply the same ranking in terms of the sum of utilities, the approach adopted by Sen 
(1970b), then the social ranking will generate an incomplete ordering  - a quasi-ordering. 
 
The alternative approach is to use available (partially comparable) information to estimate 
the expected sum of utility difference between two states and use this to generate a 
complete social ordering. Again, this will involve a degree of conjecture.  This suggests 
that partial comparability should be captured by a probability distribution over utility 
functions capturing degrees of belief.  This could be a degree of belief over sets of utility 
functions, each set being a partition of the set of functions that occurs under comparability 
of differences. In this framework, one extreme is to base aggregate judgements on the 
expected sum of utilities and create a complete ordering. The other extreme is to be risk 
averse and rank states only when it is certain that the sum of utilities is higher in one state 
than another. The intermediate case, with merit, is to rank states only when the probability 
distribution over the sum of differences is either predominantly in the positive range or 
predominantly in the negative range. Further development of this sort of approach would 
be useful. 
 
8.  Informational Bases and Welfarism 
 
The characterization results under alternative informational bases that were discussed in 
Section 5, all embody the Pareto criterion and lead to rules that can be termed, to generalize 
Sen’s (1979) definition, strict-ranking welfarism – the welfare of each state is evaluated 
using a function of utilities and the social ranking corresponds to the welfare ranking 
whenever welfare is not the same in two states. Thus, non-utility information will usually 
be excluded from the social ranking.   
Whilst it is generally recognised that the Pareto criterion conflicts with the use of non-
utility information (Sen (1970a)), it is not well recognised that the ability to make 
judgements incorporating both utility and non-utility information requires not only an 
abandonment of the Pareto criterion but also places demands on the richness of utility 
information that must be available either directly or indirectly through some estimation 
exercise.  
 
What happens if condition (P) is not imposed? In the Arrow set-up, Wilson (1972) has 
shown that conditions (U), (I) and (ND) imply either that a pair of states is ranked 
independently of preferences or there is a 'reverse dictator', where the social ranking is the 
reverse of the of the ranking of the individual who is the reverse dictator. In the first case, 
utility information is ignored, in the second non-utility information is ignored and 
individual utilities are viewed as a “bad”. 
 
To rule out utilities as a “bad”, a monotonicity condition can be imposed: 
 
Monotonicity (M*). For all u,  and x,y∈X such that  u′
u′(z,i) = u(z,i)  for all i∈N, for all z≠x,y 
u′(x,i) > u(x,i) for all i∈N, 
u′(y,i) < u(y,i) for all i∈N, 
xRy ⇒x y where R = f(<u>) and  P′ R′ = f(<u′>). 
 
Monotonicity allows for a general bias for some state y over state x but, if utility 
information is such as to create an aggregate judgement for x over y, then this is reinforced 
when utilities move further in favour of x and against y.  In the Arrow set-up, conditions 
(U), (I), (M*) and (ND) imply that utility information must be ignored in the social ranking. 
Thus, strict-ranking welfarism can be avoided by relaxing the condition (P) but at the cost 
of adopting welfare indifference with no concern for individual utilities! 
 
This striking result is a consequence of the utility informational base in the Arrow problem. 
To see this, assume that we move to the other extreme – total comparability - where utilities can be evaluated against an independent yardstick. Assume that social states are 
given some weight w(x), x∈X, independently of utilities, and that the social judgement 
takes the form of ranking x over y if the sum of utilities in state x plus w(x) is greater than 
the sum of utilities in state y plus w(y). This rule satisfies (U*), (I*), (M*) and (ND*) and 
allows a trade-off between utility and non-utility information, e.g. the function w(.) may be 
inversely related to the degree of coercion that exists in any social state.
14
 
Now assume that the appropriate informational base is that of full comparability with 
comparability of utility levels and differences. To begin, let us consider what is possible in 
a one-person society; full comparability is equivalent to a cardinal utility function for the 
individual. With condition (I*), the only relevant utility information to determine the 
ranking over a pair of states {x,y} is the individual’s ordinal ranking of the pair.  The 
ranking of x and y will either follow this individual ranking or ignore it; whatever, there can 
be no trade-off between utility and non-utility information. 
 
In a many-person society, non-utility information can interact with utility information only 
through the trade-off between individual utilities.  The full proof of this result will not be 
presented here.
15  Instead, consider a situation where the set of social states X can be 
partitioned into subsets  X1, X2,… such that if  x,y∈Xi then these states have the same non-
utility characteristics and, to compare x and y, only utility information is used to obtain a 
ranking. Then the aggregation rule to be applied over Xi will incorporate the Pareto 
criterion and, as discussed earlier, it must be welfarist.  Also, whenever there is a subset of 
states such that everybody has the same utility level in those states then a Wilson-type 
result applies over this subset.  Consider x,y∈X1 and  , x y ′ ′∈X2 such that everybody has the 
same utility level in state y and everybody has the same level in state  y′. The ranking 
between x and y, and between x′ and  y′ will be welfarist, the ranking between y and  y′ 
will be either welfarist, insuring the ranking between x and x′ is essentially welfarist, or 
the ranking between y and  y′ will be fixed independently of utilities – in which case all 
elements of X1 are always ranked above the elements of X2 or vice versa.  
 
                                                 
14 But note that there may be restrictions on the measurability of non-utility information. 
15 The proof builds upon the characterization of welfarist objectives under full comparability (Roberts  
(1980a). To give an example of what is achievable, let us focus on the case where weighted 
utilitarianism is to be applied between states with the same non-utility characteristics.  Let 
the weight on individual i be γi









= x i ∑ . 
 
Now, between two states in different partitions, the ranking will either be dictated by non-
utility characteristics or, if utility information is to be relevant, it is necessary that if  
u(x,i) = u for all i and u(w,i) = u´ for all i and u > u´ then x will be preferred.  This is 
ensured if the weights satisfy ∑i γi
j = 1. This serves to characterize the aggregation 
mechanism – states are to be judged by the weighted average utility level in the state and 
non-utility information can determine the weights to be used.  Thus, there is no possible 
trade-off between utility and non-utility information other than that the trade-off between 
two individuals’ utilities can be determined by non-utility information. 
 
If levels of utility are not interpersonal comparable then this limited possibility of 
combining utility and non-utility information is not feasible.  To see this, note first that 
comparability of differences only implies that, within each partition, the rule must be 
weighted utilitarian.
16 If utility information is relevant to rank states in partition j with 
states in partition k then the ranking will be based upon weighted utilitaranism 




k.  By adding a large enough constant to 
1's utility, states in partition j will be preferred; by adding a large enough constant to 2's 
utility, states in partition k will be preferred.  However, if there is no comparability of 
levels then the social choice should be invariant with respect to the addition of constants.  
Thus the weights must be equal across a group of partitions where rankings can depend 





i iγ = ∑
17
 
A variable weighted utilitarian rule, with weights relating to non-utility information,  
requires comparability of differences and levels to be implemented.  With only 
comparability of differences, the weights must be unvarying and non-utility information 
cannot be combined with utility information to create a social ranking. 
                                                 
16 Recall the characterization result of d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977). 
17 A formal proof is close to the proof of Theorem 9 of Roberts (1980a).  
On the other hand, if there is comparability of utility levels but no comparability of 
differences then non-utility information can help determine the utility trade-off.  For 
instance, the welfare of each state can be associated with the utility at some position in the 
utility hierarchy but the position chosen can be state dependent.  In coercive states of the 
world, welfare could be associated with the utility of the worst off individual; in states 
where there is considerable freedom, welfare could be associated with the utility of the 
individual with median utility.  Such a rule - a state dependent positional dictatorship - 
incorporates a preference for freedom, but only when there is utility inequality, and 
satisfies (U*), (I*), (M*) and (ND*) under the informational base of level comparability. 
 
9.   Concluding Remarks 
 
Following Arrow’s pioneering formulation of a structure to analyze social choice, Sen has 
made fundamental contributions in enriching the structure both with the introduction of 
social welfare functionals, and with insightful analyses of the information on which social 
welfare functionals can bear. 
 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is commonly viewed as a result of trying to do too much 
with too little information and, indeed, with interpersonally comparable information, 
aggregation mechanisms that satisfy the spirit of his axioms can be formulated. This essay 
has examined Sen’s informational enrichment approach, this being one part of his overall 
contribution to the analysis of social choice. It has been shown that whilst the use of 
interpersonal comparisons permits the implementation of whole classes of aggregation 
mechanisms, there are still severe restrictions on aspects of these mechanisms. Even with 
comparability of levels and of differences, aggregation mechanisms are restrictive, both in 
terms of the way that the distribution of utilities can be assessed, and in terms of  the way 
that utility and non-utility information can interact when welfarist conditions like the 
Pareto criterion are relaxed. To overcome these problems, rich informational structures are 
required and they come from using all available information to estimate interpersonal 
comparisons with the required degree of richness. 
 
  References 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1951).  Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley), 2nd edition  
 1963. 
 
d'Aspremont, C. and L. Gevers (1977).  'Equity and the Informational Base of Collective  
 Choice',  Review of Economic Studies, 46, 199-210. 
  
Basu, K. (1983).  'Cardinal Utility, Utilitarianism, and a Class of Invariance Axiomsis in  
  Welfare Analysis,'  Journal of Mathematical Economics, 12, 193-206. 
 
Bossert, W. (1991). 'On Intra-and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,' Social Choice and  
 Welfare, 8, 207-219. 
 
Deschamps, R. and L. Gevers (1978).  'Leximin and Utilitarian Rules: A Joint 
Characterization', Journal of Economic Theory, 17, 143-63. 
 
Fleurbaey, M. (2003). 'On the Informational Basis of Social Choice', Social Choice and 
Welfare, 21, 347-384. 
 
Gevers, L. (1979). 'On Interpersonal Comparability and Social Welfare Orderings', 
Econometrica, 47, 75-90. 
 
Hammond, P. J. (1975). 'Equity, Arrow’s Conditions and Rawls’ Difference Principle', 
Econometrica, 44, 793-804. 
 
Parks, R. P. (1976). 'An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial  
  Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function', Review of Economic Studies, 43, 447-50. 
 
Pazner, E. (1979). ' Equity, Nonfeasible Alternatives and Social Choice: a Reconsideration  
  of the Concept of Social Welfare' , in Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences (J.-J.  
  Laffont (ed.)), Amsterdam:North-Holland. 
 Robbins, L. (1935).  An Essay in the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd  
  ed., London:  Macmillan. 
 
Roberts, K. W. S. (1980). 'Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare  
 Levels',  Review of Economic Studies, 47, 409-20. 
 
Roberts, K. W. S. (1980a).  'Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory',   
  Review of Economic Studies, 47, 421-39. 
 
Roberts, K. W. S. (1980b).  'Social Choice Theory: The Single and Multi-Profile  
 Approaches',  Review of Economics Studies, 47, 441-450. 
 
Roberts, K. W. S. (1997).  'Comment on Suzumura on Interpersonal Comparisons', in  
  Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol.2 (Arrow, Sen and Suzumura, eds.) London:  
 Macmillan. 
 
Sen, A. K. (1966). 'A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions', Econometrica, 34, 481-9. 
 
Sen, A. K. (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day) 
 
Sen, A. K. (1970a). 'The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal', Journal of Political Economy,  
 78,  152-7. 
 
Sen, A.K. (1970b). 'Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability', Econometrica, 38, 
393-409. 
 
Sen, A. K. (1977).  'On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare  
 Analysis',  Econometrica, 45, 1539-72. 
 
Sen, A. K. (1979). 'Personal Utilities and Public Judgements or What's Wrong with Welfare  
 Economics',  Economic Journal, 89, 537-58. 
 
Sen, A. K. (1999) 'The Possibility of Social Choice', American Economic Review, 89, 
 349-78.   
Sen, A. K. and P. K. Pattanaik (1969). 'Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational  
  Choice under Majority Decision', Journal of Economic Theory, 1, 178-202. 
 
Strasnick, S. (1976). 'Social Choice Theory and the Derivation of Rawls’ Difference  
 Principle',  Journal of Philosophy, 73, 85-99. 
 
Wilson, R. B. (1972). 'Social Choice without the Pareto Principle', Journal of Economic  
 Theory, 5, 478-486. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 